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The British State and the Irish Rebellion of 1916: An
Intelligence Failure Or a Failure of Response?
Geoffrey Sloan, University of Reading, UK

In 1916 the conspirators within the IRB launched a long-planned surprise
attack without provocation. Peter Hart, 2002.
The Easter Rising represented –quite apart from anything else –a massive
failure for British intelligence in Ireland. Bernard Porter, 1989.
I always thought that I was very ignorant of what was going on in the
minds, and in the cellars if you like, of the Dublin population.
Augustine Birrell, Chief Secretary of Ireland.
Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland,
May 1916.

Introduction
These three epigraphs illustrate the widely accepted view of the rebellion that took place in
Ireland on April 24, 1916, and the perceived intelligence failure that preceded it.
Furthermore, historians have passed judgements on two vital contextual aspects of this event.
First the effectiveness of the intelligence that the British State had access to prior to the 1916
rebellion, and indeed up to 1921, has been characterized as an: ‘Irish Debacle.’1 Secondly, the
political context and the character of British rule in Ireland, despite the longevity of the Act
of Union, (1800) have been judged as not typical of conditions that pertained in the rest of the
United Kingdom: “In 1900 the United Kingdom was 100 years old, and that century had been
filled with the various forms of diffused insurgency on the Irish side, countered by a steady
stream of repressive legislation on the British side.”2
This article will argue that there exists in the literature on the rebellion a lacunae, specifically
with reference to the Royal Navy’s signals intelligence unit, Room 40 although its
importance was acknowledged by O’Broin in his seminal on the rebellion.3 He claimed that
the Cabinet, that included Birrell, were not given access to this unique source of intelligence.4
In short this represented a failure of intelligence not a failure of response. It will also be
argued that the intelligence institutions of the British State in Ireland functioned in an
effective enough manner given the clandestine and conspiratorial nature of the threat. Most of
the existing literature supports a teleological narrative of intelligence failure. This is set
within a wider political interpretation: “The dominant narrative remains that of the nationalist
movement in conflict with British rule.”5

1

Andrew, C., Secret Service, The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Sceptre Books,
1986), 355-372.
2
Townshend, C., Britain’s Civil Wars (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 46.
3
O’Broin, L., Dublin Castle and The 1916 Rising (London: Sidgwick and Jackson,1966), 136-140.
4
Ibid, 140.
5
Hart, P., The IRA at War 1916-1923 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 8.
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In order to address this distortion a synthetic approach will be adopted that uses the
conceptual approaches derived from Intelligence Studies. It will be argued that the British
authorities both in Dublin and London were supplied with timely and accurate intelligence
relating to events leading up to the 1916 rebellion. With respect to the latter there is evidence
to show that the political head of the Royal Navy, Arthur Balfour, gave a clear warning to the
Cabinet of this impending event: “We knew beforehand that the Revolution in Ireland would
start on Easter Monday 1916.and made naval preparations in advance. The Cabinet would not
believe the First Lord.”6 Furthermore, it was the Admiralty staff that conveyed to Downing
Street the news of the outbreak of the rebellion in Dublin: “On Easter Monday I told the Duty
Captain (DC) to keep in touch with the Post Office about the Irish Telegrams and when the
DC told me the P.O. had telephoned that the system was blocked, I telephoned to Downing
Street to the PM’s Secretary to tell the PM that the rebellion had commenced.”7 There was no
failure of intelligence in London.8 The extent to which there was one in Dublin will be
assessed later. Policy makers failed to respond to this intelligence until it was too late.
Finally, this can best be understood by an assessment of the policy assumptions of the key
British decision makers prior to the rebellion.9 For this approach to be successful a number of
related questions need to be addressed. What was the nature of the intelligence institutions
upon which the Irish Executive of the British Government depended? Can the failure of
response be explained by the manner in which the intelligence was processed? Why did the
decision makers fail to respond to the intelligence warnings until it was too late? Can an
assessment be made, in hindsight, of the quality of the intelligence that policy makers were
supplied with?

Living with the Past
Before these questions can be addressed it is important to locate this article in the existing
historiography. The 1916 rebellion has received a lot of attention from Irish and British
historians.10 This event has not just been considered just in an insular manner. From the late
1960s the rebellion began to interpreted in a wider context: “The historiography of this event
moved from the narrow (though of course important) focus on conspiracy and martyrdom to
the more general question of the rising as an episode in the history of all Ireland and indeed
of the British Isles.”11 More recent scholarship has argued that there is a symbiotic
relationship between Irish history and the history of the British Empire: “Modern Irish history
6

Recollections Vols 1,2, unpublished memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Henry Oliver, National Maritime
Museum, OLV 12, 165.
7
Ibid, 165.
8
Asquith and Hankey did not receive news of the rebellion until the early hours of the 25th April: “They
reached Downing Street on the 12.30am to find the first news of the Easter rebellion awaiting them. Asquith
merely said ‘Well, that‘s really something’ and went off to bed.”; Roskill, S, Hankey Man of Secrets Volume 1
1877-1918 (London: Collins 1970), 265.
9
For an incisive contribution to the literature on the relationship between intelligence and policy assumptions
see Pillar, P.R., Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 96-120.
10
There has been a torrent of books and articles on this subject. They include: F.X. Martin, Eoin MacNeill on
the 1916 Rising, Irish Historical Studies, Vol 11,1966, 226-71; T.D. Williams(ed), The Irish Struggle,19161926 (London:1966); Nowlan, K.B. (ed ), The Making of 1916,Dublin:Stationary Office1969; Patrick, F.,
Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising 1916 (Washington D.C.: 1994); L.
O’Broin, Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising; Foy, M. and B.Barton, The Easter Rising (Stroud Gloucestershire:
Sutton Books,1999); Hart, P., I.R.A. at War 1916-1923; Jeffery, K., The GPO and the Easter Rising (Dublin:
Irish Academic Press, 2006); Townshend, C., Easter 1916 The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin, 2006);
McGarry, F., The Rising: Easter 1916 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
11
Martin, F.X. (ed ), Leaders and the Men of the Easter Rising: Dublin1916 (London:1966); D. George
Boyce,1916, Interpreting the Rising, from D. George Boyce and Alan O’ Day(eds), The Making of Modern Irish
History (London: Routledge,1986), 165.
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unfolded in tandem with the rise, unprecedented expansion and eventual decline of the
Empire, and just as Irish history does not make sense without the imperial entanglement,
British imperial history assumes its full dimension if Ireland is included.”12 Understanding
the nature of the concerns that the intelligence institutions of the British State had with
respect to Ireland, and policy makers’ reaction to this information, only makes sense if
understood in a broader context.
Grob –Fitzgibbon has argued that the Irish Revolution covers the years 1912-1922, and must
be interpreted as a single historical period. Yet within that period he identifies three schools
of thought as to why the British State failed to contain and defeat an insurgency. The first one
is referred to as the colony to nation school. This interpretation is characterized in the
following way: “The British were defeated in Ireland because of the inevitability of a
successful Irish nationalist struggle an effort that had been intensifying for the previous two
centuries.”13 The second school is termed the repressive-reaction school. The key period is
1916-1921.The failure of the British State in Ireland is viewed in the following way: “British
security forces acted with undue force towards the rebels turning them into popular heroes
and swaying public opinion away from the British government and onto those who had
revolted.”14
The final interpretation is described as the inert–military school. The core of this thesis is that
the British Army faced a problem that many military organizations have faced.
Understanding the kind of conflict they were involved in, and adapting their methods of
operation accordingly: “They (the British) had been schooled in the tactics of mass
engagement and trench warfare, where the individual initiative of men and officers counted
for very little. They were untrained therefore, for the hit-and-run tactics of the Irish
Republican Army.”15
Hart argues that the origins of the rebellion can be seen in the profound changes and
destabilization of Ireland’s political structure that occurred as a result of the attempt to
introduce Home Rule. It resulted in a concatenation of events and forces that ultimately made
the rebellion possible: “The creation of the U.V.F., the Liberal government’s tolerance of it,
and the Irish Party’s passivity in the face of both, provided an opportunity for them (dissident
nationalists) to enter politics in a paramilitary guise: as the Irish Volunteers, founded in
November 1913.”16
This article locates itself in the seminal importance of the First World War.17 For the
organizers of the rebellion, British intelligence and policy makers this event was all defining.
Foster argues that: “The First World War should be seen as one of the most decisive events in
modern Irish history. Politically speaking, it temporarily defused the Ulster situation, it put
Home Rule on ice, it altered the conditions of military crises in Ireland at a stroke, and it
created the rationale for an IRB rebellion. Economically it created a spectacular boom in
agricultural prices, and high profits in agriculturally derived industries.”18 Lloyd George even
asserted the pernicious effect of Ireland on Germany’s perception of Britain’s capacity to deal
12

Kenny, K., Ireland and the British Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1.
Grob-Fitzgibbon, B., Turning points of the Irish Revolution (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 5.
14
Ibid, 8.
15
Ibid, 9.
16
Hart, IRA at War 1916-1923, 93.
17
The best book on this period is Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War.
18
Foster, R.F., Modern Ireland 1600-1972 (London: Penguin Books, 1989). 471.
13
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with a crisis in Europe: “There can be little doubt that the expectation on the Continent that
Britain had for the moment sunk so deep in the quagmires of the Irish bog as to be unable to
extricate her feet in time to march eastward, was one of the considerations which encouraged
Germany to guarantee Austria unconditional support in her Serbian adventure.”19
This conflict had a unique dimension to it. It illuminates the rationale of the interest of the
Imperial German Government in Ireland during the First World War. For the first time in the
history of warfare there were systematic attempts by military staffs to wage political warfare.
The objective was to undermine the opponent’s war effort by facilitating political unrest or
rebellion in elements of their domestic population or in the peoples of their empires. Britain
was to do this with the Arab Revolt led by T.E. Lawrence. The French were to target the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. The German effort against its enemies started as propaganda, and
it had a number of objectives:” The object of the (German) government’s multifaceted
propaganda campaign was twofold: to pin down British, French and Russian military forces
in counter-insurgency operations behind enemy lines, and to acquire a reputation (both in
neutral countries such as the United States and among progressive forces in the enemy camp)
as the protector of ‘oppressed peoples’ and the champion of the rights of maritime and
political self determination.”20 This policy evolved to a point whereby it attempted to assist
Irish political extremists to stage a rebellion in what was then an integral part of the British
State. This raises an additional question, namely were there grounds for the British State
treating these citizens who took part in the rebellion as if they were external enemies? This
question will be examined later.

Intelligence Theory, the British State and Ireland
If the First World War is the departure point, it is important to integrate the literature on
intelligence theory with the existing historiography on the British State’s intelligence
organization in Ireland. O’Halpin provides one model for judging how these structures
performed. He has argued that there were three distinct phases in the period from 1914 to
1921.21 This article will focus on the first period only. However, all three periods had similar
challenges: “These phrases are quite distinct, but in each can be seen the same problems of
obtaining, organizing and evaluating intelligence which characterized the British effort to
maintain order and political control in Ireland.”22 Grob-Fitzgibbon goes a step further and
maintains that the three interpretations, that he has outlined, have all got something missing.
The key element is intelligence: “In none of these interpretations is the question of what the
British did or did not know about the insurgents considered. Intelligence is simply not a
variable.” In terms of the historiography he agrees with O’Halpin that the nature of the
intelligence varied over the nine year period. He maintains that an analysis that has an
intelligence focus can do two things: first evaluate its role in British security failure;
secondly, it can illuminate turning points in the Irish Revolution.23
Before giving a summary of how intelligence structures were organized in Ireland it is
important to make some general comments about three themes that form an important context
of this article. First what should be the relationship between the armed forces and the police
19

D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs vol 2 (London: Nicholson &Watson, 1933), 694.
Keylor, W., The Twentieth Century World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 59.
21
They were 1914 -1916, 1916-1918, and 1918 to 1921. See E.O’Halpin, British Intelligence in Ireland, 19141921 from C Andrew and D. Dilks,(eds) The Missing Dimension (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984),
54.
22
Ibid.
23
Grob –Fitzgibbon, Turning Points in the Irish Revolution, 10.
20
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in countering the threat of rebellion? What do we mean by intelligence failure? Finally, what
is the utility of intelligence to governance and war, and how had they evolved by the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With respect to the first question the relationship in
a liberal state should be one of mutual support and co-operation. This has been summarised
by J.F.C. Fuller: “The maintenance of law and order requires two forces, one mobile and one
stable. The mobile force is represented by the police, who do not so much enforce the law as,
through their uniforms express it. They move everywhere, and though little is said, they
endow peace-lovers with a confidence in security and peace-haters with a fear of punishment.
The stable force is the army, which quite rightly, is little seen in public; nevertheless, silently
it stands behind the police ever ready to enforce the law when persuasion not to break it fails
to impress the lawless.”24 Another key point was a legal one. Ireland in the two years prior to
the rebellion it was subject to, in line with the rest of the United Kingdom, the Defence of the
Realm Act. This act gave the government the ability, amongst other things, to introduce
statutory martial law if required.25 More pertinent to the Irish rebellion it gave power to
military tribunals to try cases of collusion with the enemy: “A charge which the rebels had,
by trumpeting in the proclamation of the Republic their ‘gallant allies in Europe,’ openly
embraced.”26
The need, at the operational level, that the mobile and stable forces have in common with
respect to any clandestine organization is the necessity to divert and penetrate networks. This
can only be done by access to intelligence. Despite this similarity Keith Jeffery maintains the
police and the army will use the intelligence gained in different ways: “The emphasis on
police methods, which, if the campaign is successful, must eventually prevail, puts a
premium on intelligence, since effective police work depends on good information. But the
information which the police need to bring terrorists to justice, and to secure convictions, is
often of a different quality from that which military intelligence officers require for purely
operational reasons.”27
Secondly, there is the concept of intelligence failure. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour is
often cited as a classic example of this. Herman claims that it has: “become part of modern
political vocabulary.”28 It has been termed “warning failure.” This usually precedes a surprise
attack that takes place in peacetime and leads to the initiation of war. There is an impressive
historical pedigree.29 It can also be understood as something that all intelligence
organizations are vulnerable to: “No matter how well an intelligence service is organized,
how sound its tradecraft, how extensive its resources, and how skilful the people who staff it,
it will sometimes fail.”30
It is important to differentiate this concept from the idea of a failure of policy response:
“Warning without response is useless. ‘Warning’ is evidence filtered through perception;
‘response’ is action designed to counter an attack (alert, mobilization, and readiness). The
24

Fuller, J. F. C. , The Reformation of War (London: Hutchinson 1923), 201.
In March 1915 this act was amended to guarantee a civil trial to British citizens for most breaches of the act.
Furthermore, it was under this act that the Irish rebels were tried, not martial law.
26
Townshend, Easter 1916 The Irish Rebellion, 1188.
27
K. Jeffery, “Intelligence and Counter –Insurgency Operations: Some Reflections on the British Experience,”
Intelligence and National Security 2:1 (January 1987): 119.
28
Herman, M., Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221.
29
Herman lists: Denmark and Norway in 1940; Pearl Harbour in 1941; Russia in 1941; Korea in 1950 ; Chinese
attack in 1962; Czechoslovakia in 1968; the Yom Kippur in 1973; the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979; the
Falklands in 1982; Kuwait in 1990. Ibid, 221-222.
30
Pillar, P.R., Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 217.
25
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linkage between the two is accurate evaluation and sound judgement, the lack of which is the
source of most victims’ failures to avoid the avoidable.”31 The relationship between warning
and response is not one of binary opposition: “Because warning is a continuum, and because
surprise attacks are the end products of prolonged tension rather than genuine bolts-from-theblue, decision makers are used to living in an environment of some warning. The concern is
how much accumulated warning warrants military reaction that will pose financial,
diplomatic, and domestic political costs”32
The arbiter between these two concepts is policy preferences and the assumptions that they
are based on. It is the weft and warp of determining whether intelligence warnings have any
purchase on policy makers: “The intelligence services may collect and analyse the
information in a professional way (although they also have institutional interests) but how
that information is used depends on the policy preferences and power relations of politicians
and officials.”33 This raises the question about the policy preferences of the Chief Secretary
of Ireland, Augustine Birrell and his civil servants in the period that preceded the rebellion:
“The policy to which Birrell introduced Nathan (Under-Secretary, Dublin Castle) was to pave
the way for Home Rule and make any other solution of the Irish political problem impossible.
Apart from the Home Rule measure, he had carried no fewer than fifty-five bills through the
House of Commons, dealing with subjects such as land purchase, housing and the National
University.”34
Finally, what is the utility of intelligence to governance and war, and how they evolved by
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries? Intelligence conceptualised as secret
information is as old as government and war itself. In Britain Cabinet government has its
origins in an early modern intelligence institution: “The modern British Cabinet has origins in
the ‘Intelligence Committee’ of the Privy Council which existed briefly after 1660.”35 In
terms of warfare ancient Chinese General Sun Tzu, writing in 400BC, coined one of the most
important aphorisms about the utility of intelligence in war: “Now the reason that the
enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their
achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. What is foreknowledge cannot
be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from
calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation.”36
In the nineteenth century the increasing relevance of military and naval intelligence grew as a
result of developments in weapons and transport technology.37 The tactical and operational
implications of these changes increased the opportunity for strategic surprise. The
institutional response was to create permanent military and naval staffs who would be
charged with planning, mobilization, and control of their forces. There was a continual need
for information about the enemy and a good understanding of the capabilities of their own
forces. The study of the former and process of identifying new enemies brought about the
inception of permanent ‘intelligence staffs.’ In Britain this led the following institutional
developments: “A new War Office Intelligence Branch was formed in 1873 and an Indian
31

R. K. Betts, “Surprise Despite Warning,” from C. Andrew, R. Aldrich, W. Wark (eds) Secret Intelligence A
Reader Intelligence (London: Routledge, 2009), 91.
32
Ibid. p97.
33
M.J. Smith, “Intelligence and the Core Executive,” Public Policy and Administration 25:1 (January 2010): 26.
34
O’Broin, Dublin Castle and the 1916 Rising, 17.
35
Quoted in M. Herman, Intelligence Power In Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 10.
36
Tzu, Sun, The Art of War, translated by S.B. Griffith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963) 144-145.
37
Herman, Intelligence Power In Peace and War, 16.
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Intelligence Branch in 1878. The Admiralty created its Foreign Intelligence Committee in
1882; and the first War Office and Admiralty Directors of Intelligence (DMI and DNI) were
both appointed in 1887.”38
It was one of the incumbents of the latter post, Captain William Reginald Hall RN, who was
to play such a pivotal role in the provision of intelligence to policy makers prior to the
rebellion. Hall’s post as DNI gave him access to the Royal Navy’s pioneering signals
intelligence unit, Room 40.39
Europe was the source of a type of policing the British State applied to Ireland in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. This policing appeared on the European continent in the first
half of the nineteenth century. Initially it was a response to the perceived threat of another
French revolution: “The earliest separate institution for this purpose was the Russian Third
Section of the Imperial Chancery founded in 1826, and later succeeded by the Okhrana and
its eventual communist descendant: the KGB.”40 The skills this new kind of policing called
for placed an emphasis on the recruitment of agents, surveillance, and the ability in intercept
communications between members of subversive organizations.
Great Britain did not have a political policing section, which became known as the ‘Fenian
Office,’ until 1881.41 This was in response to a bombing campaign by Irish political
extremists. The murder in Dublin of two key members of the Irish Executive one year later
led to calls for similar efforts to be made in Ireland.42 This led to the setting up of a new
independent Irish secret service department in Dublin Castle.43 In England a second wave of
bomb outrages led to the setting up of the ‘Irish Branch’ which replaced the ‘Fenian Office’
in March 1883.
The two police forces in Ireland tasked to obtain, organize, and evaluate political intelligence
were the Royal Irish Constabulary, and the Dublin Metropolitan Police.44 Both these forces
were involved in all three of these functions in the period leading up to the rebellion. It is
important to understand how these forces were structured to perform these functions.
The RIC had an intelligence gathering structure which extended throughout Ireland. It was
known as the ‘Crimes Special’ Branch. It was responsible to the Irish Executive for political
intelligence, and for the collection of information about political and agrarian crimes. A
succinct description of how this structure was configured can be found in an Army document
written in 1922:
38

Ibid, 16-17.
Andrew, C., Secret Service, The Making of the British Intelligence Community (London: Sceptre Books,
1986), 139-194; Beesley, P., Room 40: British Naval Intelligence 1914-1918 (London: Hamish Hamilton,
1982).
40
Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, 16.
41
For a detailed account see B. Porter, Plots and Paranoia (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 103.
42
They were Lord Frederick Cavendish, Chief Secretary for Ireland, and Thomas Burke permanent under
secretary both of whom were murdered in May 1882 as they walked through Phoenix Park in Dublin.
43
Porter, B., Plots and Paranoia (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 103.
44
The Royal Irish Constabulary was formed in 1836 as a result of the Irish (Constabulary - Ireland) Act, 1836. It
was disbanded on the August 30, 1922. The power to appoint and discharge members of the force, to make rules
and to fix salaries was vested in the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; The Dublin Metropolitan Police was set up in
1836 as a result of the Irish (Constabulary - Ireland) Act, 1836. It was absorbed into the Garda Siochana in
1925. The DMP was closely modelled on London’s Metropolitan Police They were both commanded by a
Commissioner, who was not a police officer, but a magistrate holding a Commission of the Peace. It was also an
unarmed force.
39
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“At Headquarters in Dublin an officer graded as a county inspector was in charge. His staff
consisted of a district inspector and several clerks. There was a ‘Crimes Special’ sergeant at
each County Headquarters, and, at most District Headquarters a specially selected constable.
Two special men were also stationed at Glasgow, Liverpool and Holyhead. The duty of the
‘Crimes Special’ men was to prepare returns of the various political organizations in their
areas, to obtain an accurate knowledge of local political suspects and leaders, and to attend
meetings and report speeches. Some of this information they obtained themselves, but they
were also dependent on the uniformed members of the force most of whom had excellent
local knowledge. All information was passed to the County Inspector for transmission to
headquarters.”45
Political intelligence could be provided from all thirty-two counties of Ireland, with the
exception of the City of Dublin, to the Irish Executive. This system was not without its
weaknesses, the prime one being that initiative was often left to County Inspectors: “There
was little guidance from above owing to the fact that the establishment of headquarters was
so small that it was impossible to communicate fully with every County Inspector. The result
was that at headquarters information on general subjects was meagre and patchy while
information concerning individuals was limited to that about comparatively few persons of
the most extreme type.”46
The Dublin Metropolitan Police had a different structure. Embedded in its organization was a
detective branch that was known as ‘G’ Division. This Division had a dual function. It was
responsible for keeping the Irish Executive informed regarding political extremists in the City
of Dublin. Yet its principal duty was the detection of crime in Dublin. This system was
judged by the same army document to be effective: “Up to November, 1919, it was in charge
of a Police Superintendent who was directly under the Chief Commissioner. This officer
through his long service in Ireland, had a good knowledge of the various secret political
organizations in the country, and his registry was sufficiently well-organized to enable him to
personally compile a reasonably satisfactory report on such organizations or on any wellknown extremist, when he was called to do so.”47 O’Halpin makes the point that although the
two police forces worked closely together there was a difference in the intelligence material
that they tended to produce: “The DMP detectives (of whom less than a dozen were
concerned with political matters) concentrated on shadowing suspects, attending political
meetings and keeping premises under observation, whereas the RIC, a force developed
specifically in response to political and agrarian crime were better able to find out what was
going on in each area and to detect changes in the political climate.”48
At the beginning of the First World War these organizations were supplemented in a number
important ways. An RIC officer, Inspector Ivan Price, was appointed as an intelligence
officer to the army’s Irish Command with the rank of Major. He received all the intelligence
produced by the two police forces and dealt with Colonel Kell head of MI5, based at the War
Office in London. He also had access to other information.49

45

Record of the Rebellion In Ireland. Vol. 11, Intelligence 1922, 4.
Ibid.
47
Record of the Rebellion In Ireland, 5.
48
O’Halpin, E., “British Intelligence in Ireland, 1914-1921” from C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds), The Missing
Dimension (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 55.
49
Ibid, 55.
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The Royal Navy set up a separate intelligence organization in Ireland. It was headed by a W.
V. Harrel, a former Assistant Commissioner of the DMP.50 O ’Halpin maintains that its remit
was limited: “Its activities were limited to ‘Admiralty matters’ and touched on more general
questions only in relation to the loyalty of dockyard employees.”51 Critically he maintains
that this organization had: “virtually no contact with naval intelligence in London.”52 This
assertion is not borne out by the evidence from the Oliver memoirs: “He (Hall) did a good job
in Ireland, an officer in the RIC (it was the DMP) had been retired, a political scapegoat
because he ordered constabulary to fire on a savage mob in Dublin. Hall made this officer his
head agent in Ireland and he did splendid work.”53 Crucially the Naval Intelligence Division
of the Admiralty was not limited to the organization and evaluation of intelligence that came
from outside Ireland.

Intelligence Warnings and Responses
Having established the nature of the intelligence institutions upon which the British State was
dependent upon both in Dublin and London it is intended to outline the nature and structure
of the organizations that British intelligence attempted to penetrate. An assessment will be
made as to how the intelligence obtained was affected by the power relations that existed
within the institutions of the British State.
In terms of the nature and structure of these organizations the best analogy is that of a
Russian doll. Hidden from view was a secret and subversive organization called the Irish
Republican Brotherhood.54 Linked to the IRB was a sister organization in the United States
called Clan Na Gael.55 This latter organization had a partial public profile. The former
organization was to play a pivotal role in the rebellion: “The Easter Rising of 1916 was
planned and executed by a secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican
Brotherhood (IRB) and, in particular, a small Military Council of Leaders, Tom Clarke, Sean
MacDermott, Patrick Pearse, Eamonn Ceannt, Joseph Plunkett and Thomas Mac Donagh.”56
Linked to the IRB and Clan Na Gael were two organizations with a public profile: the Irish
Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army.57
50

He had been dismissed from the DMP following the Bachelor’s Walk shootings in 1914.
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The British State obtained intelligence about the links between the IRB and Clan na Gael and
the Irish Volunteers from the Detective Department of the DMP as early as December 1914.
They had been successful in placing an agent inside the Irish Volunteers: “I beg to report that,
according to an informant, the Clan- na-Gaels have taken over military control of the Sinn
Fein Section of the Irish Volunteers…All matters of policy will be determined by the Clan na
Gael Executive. The funds will remain for the present, subject to audit, in the hands of the
Irish Treasurers. The informant adds that an agent from America will likely visit this country
on an early date to carry out the terms of the Alliance The Irish Republican Brotherhood will
also have representation on this new Executive, which will receive financial support from the
Irish Societies in America.”58
This intelligence was incorporated into a Cabinet document that was dated January 1915.The
assumption can be made that members of Cabinet were in receipt of this information.
Secondly the veracity of this intelligence was endorsed by Brien’s line manager who added
that: “This information comes from a good source and is believed to be correct.”59 The use of
an agent yielded further detailed information about the identities of the recipients of these
funds: “Before the split between the National and Irish Volunteers considerable funds were
coming from America and being paid into various banks in Dublin to the account of Mr John
MacNeill, President of the General Council and Executive Committee, and Mr M.J.
O’Rahilly, Treasurer, or to the joint account of these two gentleman.”60 The money was being
used for two things: the purchase of arms, and the funding of seditious newspapers and
leaflets.61 One of these documents can be described as crude geopolitical propaganda. It had
outlined the strategic benefits that would accrue to an independent Ireland in the event of a
German victory in the war.62 O’Halpin claims that it was not until 1915 that the police in
Ireland had any reliable agents inside the Irish Volunteers: “In 1915 two low level
informants, ’Chalk’ and ‘Granite’ were place or found in the Irish Volunteers. These
provided scraps of worthwhile intelligence, but they were not in a position to say what their
leaders intended.”63
The second source of intelligence that the British State had access to was the telegraphic
cables that were sent between the Imperial German Government in Berlin, and its embassy in
Washington. These communications illuminated the relationship between the German
government and Clan Na Gael and the IRB. This relationship had been forged on August 24,
1914 when the leading members of Clan Na Gael met the German Ambassador in New York:
“The Irish representatives quite clearly stated their purpose, namely to use the opportunity of
the European War to overthrow British Rule in Ireland.”64 The German Government
established a clandestine office of the German embassy in New York to facilitate this newly
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established relationship.65 A key conduit was Sir Roger Casement.66 He had first come to the
attention of the British authorities by the publication in 1913 of a seditious pamphlet
published under the pen name of ‘Shan Van Vocht.’ He outlined a pro-German geopolitical
scenario: “An Ireland already severed by a sea held by German warships, and temporarily
occupied by a German army, might well be permanently and irrevocably severed from Great
Britain, and with common assent elected into a neutralized, independent European state under
international guarantees.”67 In October 1914 Casement, funded by Clan Na Gael with $3000,
left New York for Berlin using a false passport using the assumed name of James E. Landy.68
When he arrived in Berlin, there were number of objectives he had been set. The first was a
German Government declaration in favour of Irish independence. This was duly made by the
German Government on November 20, 1914. However, there were other targets which he had
been set: “Such as support for rebellion in Ireland; a propaganda campaign in Germany in
order to win public support for eventual German actions in Ireland; the formation of a
military unit from Irish prisoners of war held by the Germans.”69 Casement was actively
involved in the last activity personally visiting the German POW camps at Zossen and
Limberg in an effort to recruit an ‘Irish Brigade’ for the German government.70
Britain did not remain passive with respect to Casement’s activities. In December 1914, the
Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain William Reginald Hall RN went to extraordinary
lengths to spring a trap. It received intelligence, probably through Room 40, that indicated
that a Danish ship was being commissioned by the German Government to take Casement
back to Ireland. As a response Hall chartered a yacht called the Sayonara.71 By December 15,
the yacht was cruising off the west coast of Ireland, and was under the command of Lt Symon
RN, who along with a selected crew of naval ratings affected American accents and pro Irish
republican sympathies. The ‘owner’ of the yacht was a German-American called Colonel
MacBride of Los Angles. He was in fact an SIS officer called Major W.R. Howells.72
In early January 1915 Hall sent the following message sent to Symon: ”It is anticipated that
C will arrive in the Danish steamer Mjolnir of Copenhagen -500tons.She is due to leave
Christians and on (January 9) and should be off the west coast of Ireland between the 13th
and the 15th.”73 As well attempting to capture Casement, Hall used the suspicion that the
Sayonara had generated with respect to the naval command in Queenstown and Royal Navy
65
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patrols off the Irish coast to gather intelligence about Irish republicans: “Those on board the
Sayonara were so ‘chivvied’ by the British authorities that the ‘bad boys’ came to them like
flies to a treacle –pot and they were able to meet almost everyone who was working against
us.”74 Hall claimed that the efforts of Simon and Howell provided a force multiplier for
British intelligence in Ireland in the period that preceded the rebellion: “It was largely due to
their efforts that right up to the Irish rebellion of 1916 we were able to keep watch on the
most disloyal elements with comparatively few men.”75 This is further evidence to show that
Hall’s organization was running agents in Ireland. With respect to Casement, on this
occasion, Hall’s dependence on signals intelligence proved to be unreliable. By January 19,
1915, Hall was forced to admit defeat. On that date he sent Symon the following message:
“We have lost track of C.”76 The Sayarona returned to Portsmouth shortly after having
received this message.
The other challenge that British intelligence faced was understanding how Germany’s policy
with respect to providing assistance to the IRB and the Irish volunteers was evolving. Initially
the German High Command was presented with military plans from the IRB and the Irish
Volunteers that entailed a German led invasion: “The original plan for the 1916 Rising
involved an elaborate county-by–county rebellion, which would have depended for its
success on a German backed invasion with the landing being at Limerick. This was the basis
of the proposal put forward by Joseph Plunkett and Sir Roger casement to the Germans in
1915.”77 By March 1916 the scope of the plan had narrowed to a request from Irish
Revolutionary Headquarters for the following munitions: field guns, German gun crews and
officers, machine guns, rifles and ammunition.78 The German High Seas Fleet should make a
demonstration in the North Sea and a submarine should be detailed to Dublin Bay.79 Finally,
the Germans decided to supply rifles and machine guns, and sortie elements of their High
Seas Fleet to bombard a town in Kent.80 The weapons and ammunition were to be loaded
onto a captured British ship from the Wilson Line that was renamed the Aud.
In terms of obtaining and evaluating intelligence concerning German involvement in the
rebellion and the links to Clan na Gael, the IRB and the Irish Volunteers British intelligence
was able to exploit a key weakness. There was no means of direct communication between
the German General Staff and Admiralty and members of the IRB or Irish Volunteers in
Ireland. Monteith who landed with Casement from U-19 made this clear: “We knew nothing
of the progress of the organization in Ireland since my departure seven months earlier.”81 An
indirect route, using diplomatic telegrams, went from Berlin to the German Embassy in
Washington DC and in the other direction. The Clan Na Gael organization then used a secret
courier to get messages to and from Ireland.82 Britain was able to gain a detailed insight to the
developing plans by intercepting communications in route to the United States, and back
from the United States to Germany. These decrypts provided a means whereby Britain could
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monitor the assistance the German government was giving to the IRB and the Irish
Volunteers.83
It has been claimed by Christopher Andrew that all three of the main German naval codes did
not fall into British hands until December 1914.84 Furthermore, it was not until the summer of
1915 that Hall set up a diplomatic annex to Room 40.85 However, diplomatic messages from
the German Embassy in Washington to the Foreign office in Berlin were being read as early
as September 1914: “I am telegraphing, because written reports are too unsafe. I do not think
it necessary in this matter to be too much exercised about American public opinion, as we are
most likely to find friends here if we give freedom to oppressed peoples, such as the Poles,
the Finns and the Irish…..The decisive point to me seems to me to lie in the question whether
any prospect of an understanding with England is now in view, or must we prepare ourselves
for a life and death struggle. If so, I recommend falling in with Irish wishes, provided that
there are really Irishmen who are prepared to help us.”86
This intercepted message raises the question of which cable route the Germans were using
after their own transatlantic cables were cut at the beginning of the war? The Command
Paper of 1921 stated its intention of not: “disclosing sources of information and channels of
communication.”87 One of the routes used was referred to as the “Swedish roundabout.”88
The pro-German Swedish government allowed the Germans to use their trans- Atlantic
cables. In a memorandum written for Lloyd George in 1920 by a former Attorney-General for
Ireland, he reveals the two routes the British signals intelligence was intercepting: “Care has
been taken not to show the channel of communication of telegrams passing through the
Swedish Ministry at Stockholm or Buenos Aires, or those passing through Madrid.”89
The breakthrough came on February 10, 1916.This was the date when the British intercepted
and decrypted the following message ‘on the position in Ireland’ from John Devoy.90 It had
been delivered to the German Embassy in Washington for transmission to Berlin:
“Unanimous opinion that action cannot be postponed much longer. Delay disadvantageous to
us. We can now put up an effective fight. Our enemies cannot allow us much more time. The
arrest of our leaders would hamper us severely. Initiative on our part is necessary. The Irish
regiments which are in sympathy with us are being gradually being replaced by English
regiments. We have therefore decided to begin action on Easter Saturday. Unless entirely
new circumstances arise we must have your arms and munitions in Limerick between Good
Friday and Easter Saturday. We expect German help immediately after beginning action. We
might be compelled to begin earlier.”91
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A further message was intercepted on the 18th February that confirmed the earlier proposals
of the IRB. This message was sent using another route that the British were monitoring. The
American transatlantic cable which Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, was given access to
as a means of discussing President Wilson’s peace initiative: “The Irish leader, John Devoy,
informs me that rising is to begin in Ireland on Easter Saturday.92 Please send arms to (arrive
at) Limerick, west coast of Ireland between Good Friday and Easter Saturday. To put it off
longer is impossible. Let me know if help may be expected from Germany. Bernstorff.”93
Another message was intercepted from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the German Embassy
in Washington on March 4, 1916: “Between April 20-23, in the evening, two or three steam
trawlers could land 20,000 rifles and ten machine-guns, with ammunition and explosives at
Fenit Pier in Tralee Bay. Irish pilot–boat to await the trawlers at dusk, north of the island of
Inishtooskert at the entrance of Tralee Bay, and show two green lights close to each other at
short intervals. Please wire whether the necessary arrangements in Ireland can be made
secretly through Devoy. Success can only be assured by the most vigorous efforts.”94 The
arrangement with respect to the pilot boat had been requested by Captain Von Haugwitz of
the German General Staff.95 Monteith also confirms that the original plan to send two
trawlers was later cancelled and a single ship substituted.96
The only information that British intelligence did not have access to was the extent to which
the IRB and the Irish Volunteers would be able to respond to the arrangements that had been
proposed by the Germans. On March 12, two messages were intercepted by the British that
completed the picture: “On March 12, 1916, a code message in German was sent by wireless
from the German Embassy in Washington to Banker Max Moebius, Oberwallstrasse, Berlin.
Translated it read: “National Germania Insurance Contract certainly promised. Executor is
evidently satisfied with proposition. Necessary steps have been taken –Henry Newman.
Decoded it reads:
Irish agree to proposition.
Necessary steps have been taken.97
The second message was sent from the German Embassy in Washington to the Foreign
Office in Berlin, and revealed that the Clan Na Gael were using, as previously stated, a
courier for their communications with Ireland: “Irish agree. Will follow instructions. Details
sent to Ireland by messenger.”98
By mid March 1916, the British authorities had a comprehensive understanding and
knowledge of the planned rebellion: “The decrypts revealed the extent of the German
complicity in the Easter Rising…. between 1914 and 1917 Room 40 intercepted over thirty
messages between Bernstorff and Berlin indicating German support for the extremists.”99
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Given the intelligence that Britain now had obtained on this planned rebellion, it is important
to pose two questions. Firstly was this information communicated to the authorities in
Ireland? Secondly, how comprehensive was the dissemination of intelligence to both the
mobile and stable forces of law and order?100 O’Halpin has claimed that Dublin Castle was
not informed that the Aud had left for Ireland loaded with arms until April 17. Furthermore,
the army commander in Ireland General Friend was informed of this by Brigadier General
Stafford. He in turn had learned this ‘not officially but casually’ from Admiral Bayly,
Admiral commanding the Western Approaches at Queenstown.101
Yet there is evidence to suggest that there was a co-ordinated response by both the military
(stable force) and the two police forces in Ireland (mobile forces) to this intelligence. The
Commanding Officer of the Queenstown Garrison, Brigadier General Stafford, has given an
insightful account: “On Sunday (April 16) inst I received information that two German
submarines either alone or escorting a ship disguised as a tramp steamer left Germany on the
12th inst with a view to landing arms and ammunition on the SW Coast of Ireland. It was
further stated that the arms etc were to be conveyed to Limerick and that a rising was timed
for Easter Eve (today) I immediately wrote to the GOC in C giving him my information. On
the 17th I proceeded early with Colonel Buckley G.S.O. to Limerick, interviewed the DIRIC
in the absence of the County Inspector, gave him such of my information as I thought
desirable and asked him to communicate this at once secretly to CI Clare and CI Kerry. I also
saw the OC 4th Leinster Regt, gave him all the necessary information and directed him to
afford assistance if called upon, by the RIC to picket roads leading into Limerick City.”102
The warning also went to the top of the British administration in Ireland. Stafford’s
intelligence was not just passed to the army’s Irish Command Headquarters in Dublin. The
head of the RIC, and the Under- Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, the most senior civil servant
in Ireland were also in receipt of this information: “On the 17th of that month (April) the
Major-General Commanding (GOC Ireland) showed to the Under Secretary (Sir Matthew
Nathan) at the Castle a letter from the Officer Commanding Queenstown defences which told
of a contemplated landing from a German ship, rigged up as a neutral and accompanied by
two submarines, of arms and ammunition on the south-west coast with a view to their
reaching Limerick, and of a rising timed for Easter eve……The letter was shown to the
Inspector-General, Royal Irish Constabulary, and the County Inspectors in the south and
south-west counties were put on their guard. The Chief Commissioner, Dublin Metropolitan
Police, was also informed so that a watch could be kept on the turbulent spirits in Dublin, and
he arranged with the military authority for armed pickets of 100 men to be henceforth nightly
available at each of the four main barracks. There were the usual meetings of suspects in
Dublin on the 17th and the 18th.”103
The Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith had been in receipt of an intelligence warning that
predated Stafford’s information by twenty-four days: “On March 23, 1916, the Director of
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Military Intelligence informed General Headquarters, Home Forces, that he had received
information from an absolutely reliable source that a rising in Ireland was contemplated at an
early date, and that extremists in that country were in communication with Germany with a
view to obtaining German assistance. He added that the rising was timed to take place on
April 22 and that Irish extremists has asked Germany to supply arms and ammunition in
Limerick by that date. Acting on similar information the Admiral at Queenstown issued a
stringent order for the patrolling of the Irish Coast.104 O’Halpin maintains that this
intelligence obtained in the third week of March was not passed onto the Irish authorities.105
On April 12, 1916 Sir Roger Casement, Robert Monteith and Daniel Julian Bailey, both
members of the ‘Irish Brigade’ embarked on U-20 at Wilhelmshaven. The night before their
departure they had been given a final briefing by the German General Staff.106 They were
given two important things: a code for communication; and a clear commitment of further
supplies of arms and ammunition if required: “The code, as the photograph shows, was
devised in order that we might communicate with the Germans should operations be
prolonged, necessitating further supplies of ammunition and material.”107 This line of
communication was to be maintained from April 20 to May 20, 1916. Due to a mechanical
failure they transferred to U19 after a day and a half at sea. The Aud set sail on April 10
disguised as a Norwegian steamer commanded by a reserve Lieutenant Karl Spindler. The
crew consisted of three officers one helmsman, and fifteen sailors of the Imperial German
Navy. It was carrying a cargo of 20,000 Italian rifles that had been captured by the Germans
from the Russian Army on the Eastern Front, plus 10 million rounds of ammunition, 10
machine guns, one million rounds of machine-gun ammunition, explosives, landmines,
bombs, and hand grenades.108
At midnight on April 20, a German U-boat, U 19, commanded by Captain Weisbach, arrived
at the pre-arranged rendezvous point. This was a one mile north west (NW 16’) of
Inishtooskert Island, at the entrance of Tralee Bay on the west coast of Ireland. Two
important meetings had been scheduled to take place there. The Aud was to rendezvous with
U-19 during the period April 20-23 after 10 pm and a pilot boat, which was to show two
green lights, was to meet U19 and take Casement and his two companions ashore. The first
meeting never took place. The Aud, due to a navigational error, was several miles from this
point. This was compounded by the fact that the Royal Navy was already shadowing the
ship:” The Aud had been shadowed for a considerable distance down the coast and kept
under close observation while in Tralee Bay.”109 The increased patrolling ordered by the
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Admiral at Queenstown had the required effect. HMS Bluebell was one of the patrolling
vessels: ”The Commander of the Bluebell took definite action by approaching to within about
three miles distance from the “Aud” and asking What is your name? Where do you come
from? To which the Aud replied. “The Aud from Bergen to Genoa with cargo” Then to the
question what are you doing here? The Aud replied, “I have lost my bearings, and I am taking
them from the Irish coast.”110 This ruse failed as the Aud was shadowed and informed that
she was being escorted “to Queenstown for search.” At the position of one mile south of the
lightship at Daunts Rock, at the entrance to Cork Harbour, Lieutenant Spindler took action to
scuttle his ship: “Suddenly the Aud stopped, hoisted two German naval ensigns, and lowered
her boats into which got the officers and seamen –about thirty in number, in naval uniform.
Then an explosion occurred in the Aud and she went to the bottom.”111 Grob-Fitzgibbon
maintains that the Royal Navy sank the Aud.112
The second meeting also failed to happen. The pilot boat never materialised. The initial plan
had been for Casement, Monteith, and Bailey to go ashore in the pilot-boat which would also
make contact with the Aud. Captain Weisbach had an alternative set of orders to be used if
the pilot boat failed to appear. This was to land the three men in the submarine’s inflatable
dinghy, this plan not without its risks owing to the war the local population had been urged
by the RIC to report any activity that could be the prelude to an invasion. There was a witness
to the three men moving inland from the beach: “The instructions we got were to request the
people living along the coast to inform us if they saw any indication of a hostile landing.
They always reported anything unusual they saw and this instruction was in existence from
the outbreak of the war. It was when Mary (Gorman) was milking cows between 3 and 4
o’clock in the morning that she observed three men coming from the direction of the sea.”113
Secondly, there was a report made by a member of the public at 8am to Ardfert RIC station.
It indicated a boat floating at the edge of the shore. This resulted in patrols being sent out in
the local area. It was one of these patrols that encountered Casement hiding in McKenna’s
Fort. Of the two other men landed from U 19, Monteith evaded capture and Bailey was
arrested two days later. Casement’s arrest came after an exchange with two RIC officers,
Constable Reilly and Sergeant Hearne, in which he tried to sustain a false identity.114 News of
his capture reached Dublin Castle by the evening of April 21 and was passed on to Prime
Minister Asquith: “At 6.30 pm the RIC Office in Dublin Castle received the following
message from District Inspector W.A. O’Connell in Tralee: “This morning patrol from
Ardfert captured boat, one thousand rounds of ammunition, three Mauser pistols, maps,
papers, all German. Arrested one prisoner, two escaped, believed to have come off Dutch
vessel.”115 The mobile and stable forces of law and order co-operated closely in the matter of
Casement’s security. At 10.30 pm the DI O’Connell contacted the army garrison at
Queenstown and informed them that he had made an important capture. As a consequence he
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feared an attempted rescue. By 11 pm the army had ordered 100 men of the 3rd Battalion
Royal Dublin Fusillers to proceed to Tralee to foil any attempted rescue of Casement.116
With the interception of the Aud and Casement’s arrest, the plans that had been made to coordinate the landing of the weapons took on a farce like quality. On April 21, Irish Volunteers
Austin Stack and Cornelius Collins were attempting to oversee a plan that went very wrong.
That evening a car was driven off the end of Ballykissane Pier and all the occupants bar one
were drowned. They were also arrested on charges of conspiracy to land arms.117
These events represented a coup for British intelligence. Furthermore, the Royal Navy, the
British Army and the RIC had all co-operated in an effective manner. However, it would but
wrong to attribute Casement’s capture solely to the signals intelligence provided by Room
40: “We knew about Sir Roger Casement’s traitorous expedition to Ireland in a German
submarine partly from RM 40 and partly from the Head agent.”118 These events had an effect
on the leadership of the Irish Volunteers. News of Casement’s arrest and the interception of
the Aud by the Royal Navy caused Eoin MacNeill, the Chief of Staff to issue a
‘countermanding order’ against mobilization. This was distributed throughout the country by
messenger and adverts in the national press. The original plan had a mutually re-enforcing
element that now become unhinged: “The Easter Sunday manoeuvres would serve as a
distraction from the arms landing in Munster, and this in turn would enable the Volunteers to
deter or resist any attempts at suppression by the British authorities.”119 The possibility of
mobilizing the Irish Volunteers throughout Ireland had now been abandoned.120 There has
been an ongoing historical debate as to how damaging this order was to the rebellion when it
finally broke out in Dublin.121

Policy Assumptions and Intelligence Warnings
The successful response by the British authorities in preventing the landing of German arms,
and securing Casement’s arrest, stands in sharp contrast to the reaction to intelligence that
was being provided by the DMP and the RIC to key policy makers in Dublin Castle.
Townshend has argued that the: “British authorities were bombarded with warnings about the
approaching rebellion.”122 He argues that it was an intelligence failure not a failure of
response. Furthermore, he makes no reference to the assumptions that motivated policy
makers to within hours of the outbreak of the rebellion: “This was a classic instance of
intelligence failure: caused not by a lack of information, but by the blinkered view of those
whose job was to interpret it.”123 Major Price at army headquarters is cited as a source of this
failure of interpretation.124
The assumptions of the senior civil servant in Dublin Castle, Sir Matthew Nathan need to be
understood: ”Like Birrell he saw his overriding task as being to keep the situation as quiet as
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possible, to prepare the way for the constitutional nationalists to take over when Home Rule
was finally implemented.”125 This heightened the tendency of what Betts has described as the
‘allure of deferring decision.’126 For example despite being shown a letter on April 17 that
indicated, through signals intelligence intercepts, a direct connection between the German
government and the IRB127 Nathan claimed in his evidence to the Royal Commission that it
was only the interception of the ‘Aud’ and the capture of Casement three days before the
rebellion, that proved the link between the IRB and the German Government. Prior to that
reference is made only to German organizations in the United States: “Until three days before
the insurrection there had been no definite proof of any connection between the anti-British
party in Ireland and the foreign enemy. It was of course known that the Clan Na Gael, which
was in touch with the Republican Brotherhood and the Volunteers were in alliance with
German organizations in America.”128
This statement of Nathan’s raises a key point. Did evidence of ‘hostile association’ as defined
by the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 only become actionable on April 21, 1916 and before
that date it was not possible to treat these citizens as external enemies?129 In fact there existed
a range of legislation that was on the statue books prior to the First World War that could
have been applied, but was not.130 These acts gave the Irish Executive extensive powers for
dealing with riotous or unlawful assemblies. Yet their utility, and the intelligence warnings,
were ignored.
To evaluate to the degree to which there was an intelligence failure or a failure of response
that was a product of certain assumptions, it is important to assess the quality and extent of
the intelligence the RIC and the DMP were supplying. In 1922 the British Army’s view of the
Irish Executive in terms of the receipt of intelligence was simply one of a lack of resources:
”Information regarding rebel activities was very meagre, owing to the fact that during the
Chief Secretaryship of Mr Birrell the Secret Service had ceased to exist, and Sinn Fein had
every opportunity of planning and organising in security”131 This is not an accurate picture.
What is being referred to is a portion of the secret service vote that was being spent by the
Irish Executive on running agents. Since the beginning of the Liberal Administration in 1906
the amount had declined from £2,634 to £932 in 1916.132
Grob-Fitzgibbon has argued that the period from 1912 to 1914 saw the RIC and the DMP
successfully gather accurate intelligence: “Throughout this period, the British security forces
collected precise and thorough intelligence, yet politicians at the highest levels of government
refused to act on this intelligence, thus allowing the illegal armies to grow.”133 One of the
areas of focus was the Ulster Volunteer Force. This was a Unionist organization set up to
parry the intention of the Liberal Government of setting up a devolved parliament in Dublin.
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They began to import arms, some from Germany, into Ireland from late 1913. The initial
response of the government was to issue a Proclamation under the Customs Consolidation
Act of 1876 banning the importation of weapons into Ireland. Instead of enforcing this act,
political expediency triumphed: “It has been stated that as a matter of policy it was decided
by the Government not to take proceedings against those who were responsible for this
breach of the law.”134 This policy manifested itself again when the Catholic Irish National
Volunteers landed arms at Howth near Dublin in July 1914. In fact the Irish Government
decided to withdraw the Proclamation the day after the First World War broke out on August
5, 1914.The other aspect that the government failed to deal with in a coherent manner was
sedition. This took the form of anti-recruiting meetings, pamphlets, and seditious papers
which were widely circulated in Ireland during the First World War.
In terms of warnings that were being given by the ‘Crimes Special’ Branch of the RIC and
‘G’ Division of the DMP from mid 1914 onwards there were clear references to the
consequences of the conditions that the government was permitting to develop. On June 15,
1914, the Inspector-General of the RIC submitted the following report: “In Ireland the
training and drilling to the use of arms of a great part of the male population is a new
departure which is bound in the not distant future to alter all the existing conditions of life….
Events are moving. Each county will soon have a trained army far outnumbering the police,
and those who control the volunteers will be in a position to dictate to what extent the law of
the land may be carried into effect.”135 On September 7, 1914, the DMP submitted to the
government a report that stated: “There is no doubt that so far as Dublin is concerned the
majority of the Irish National Volunteers would follow the lead of the extreme section, and
hints have been given that they are not without hope of being able to assume and establish
control of the Government of Ireland before the present difficulties are over and that they
may attempt some escapade before long.”136 The Detective Department of the DMP carried
out a surveillance at the first Annual Convention of the Irish Volunteers in 1914. In fact
Nathan received notes of speeches made by Irish Volunteers at this meeting: “Speeches of the
most inflammatory and revolutionary character were delivered. The leaders predicted
rebellion and the shedding of blood “in the great fight of Ireland against the British
Empire”.137There were no specific warnings, at this stage, about the date of a rebellion. These
reports did not mean that the key decision makers would actually act on these warnings.
In terms of taking action with two important issues were conflated. First was the political
relationship between the Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell, Sir Matthew Nathan, the senior
civil servant in Dublin, and the leaders of the Irish Parliamentary Party: “His (Birrell’s) nine
year as Chief Secretary were characterized by his cultivation of the close links with the
Nationalist leaders.”138 The second was the impact of the First World War, and the
requirements of recruiting that drove Asquith’s government to pass on September 18, 1914
the Irish Home Rule Bill, and a second bill suspending its operation until after the war: “Lord
Kitchener, the new Secretary of State for War, had told them (the Cabinet) that whilst recruits
in Ulster were plentiful, outside of Ulster he had been forced to reply on English troops to fill
the gaps in the Irish Regiments. As a result they needed Redmond’s Irish Volunteers.”139
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This need to ensure a buoyant recruitment in the south of Ireland dovetailed with the policy
that Birrell was following. He wanted to keep the political situation in Ireland as quiet as
possible. This would pave the way for the constitutional nationalists, led by John Redmond
and John Dillon, to head up a devolved government in Dublin when the Home Rule Bill was
finally implemented. Paradoxically Birrell was less than convinced about the efficacy of the
policy: “Even with the Home rule on the Statue Book the chance of its ever becoming a fact
was so uncertain, the outstanding difficulty about Ulster so obvious, and the details of the
measure so unattractive and difficult to transmute into telling platform phrases that Home
Rule as an emotional flag fell out of daily use.”140
Nathan has been described as a: “loyal and conscientious, workaholic Under Secretary.”141
He displayed two characteristics that were to affect his response to intelligence warnings.
First he had a concept of loyalty that did not permit him to inform his political chief when he
thought that he was wrong.142 Secondly, he permitted the Deputy leader of the Irish
Parliamentary Party, John Dillon, to exercise undue influence on his decision making in the
months preceding the rebellion. In 1915 there is clear evidence to suggest the impact that
Dillon was having on Nathan: “We talked of the state of Ireland’ recorded Nathan after
another meeting in December,’ and the Sinn Fein movement which he now regards as very
serious but still advised me to keep my hands off the organizers.”143 The Chief Secretary,
when cross- examined at the Royal Commission about the influence of Dillon laid emphasis
on being unable to prove hostile association: “He (Dillon) thought it (Sinn Fein) dangerous,
but yet he was against it in absence of proof of hostile association with the enemy. If there
had been evidence of hostile association with the enemy which would prove, particularly
against an individual then, he naturally would have been in favour of a prosecution.”144
These political relationships have been confirmed by Arthur Norway, Secretary of the Post
Office in Ireland, and an eyewitness to the events that led up to the rebellion:“He (Sir
Matthew Nathan) had formed the habit, possibly on instructions from Mr Birrell, of
consulting John Dillon upon every step he took, and viewing everything through the eyes of
that old and inveterate rebel.”145
These assumptions mitigated against any response to the intelligence warnings that the RIC
and the DMP were assiduously reporting. The latter organization demonstrated that it also
had the capability to do more that mere surveillance of the Irish Volunteers. The DMP was
running two agents code named ‘Chalk’ and ‘Granite’ in the months before the rebellion.146
Their reports illustrated the degree to which effective police work, with respect to subversive
organizations, depended on good intelligence. The DMP built up a detailed picture of the
Irish Volunteers. On February 24, 1916 ‘Granite’ reported to ‘G’ Division detectives that:
”The organizers appear to be supplied with plenty of money and every effort is being made to
win over as many as possible of the members of the National and Redmond Volunteers. He
further added that rifles and ammunition are being stored at the residence of Michael

140

The Royal Commission in the Rebellion in Ireland, 21.
Townshend, Easter 1916,The Irish Rebellion, 88.
142
Ibid.
143
Quoted in F.S.L Lyons, John Dillon A Biography, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1968, 366.
144
The Royal Commission on the Rebellion in Ireland, 22.
145
Jeffrey, The GPO and the Easter Rising, 41.
146
It is not possible to discern if they were inside or living agents.
141

348
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5

O’Hanrahan, 26 Connaught Street; E. DeValera, 33 Morehampton Terrace; B. O’Connor,
1Brendan Terrace, Donnybrook.”147
On March 22, one month before the rebellion ‘Chalk’ gave details of a meeting he had
attended. One of the speakers was Thomas Mc Donagh.148 ‘Chalk’ reported verbatim extracts
of McDonagh’s talk: “There will be a general mobilization on the next Sunday, the April 2:
should any change take place you will be notified by our own Post, or by Head Quarters.”149
‘Chalk’ had also managed to uncover the locations of this communication system:
“Harding’s, Christ –Church Place; Head Quarters, Dawson Street, and Callan’s (address
unknown) are some of the places where letters are dealt with.”150 Perhaps the most startling
intelligence that ‘Chalk’ reveals is that the Irish Volunteers are also in receipt of intelligence
from a surprising source: “The Sinn Feiners obtain considerable information, and that, as far
as can be ascertained, it comes from the Chief Secretary’s Office at the Castle.”151 The irony
is that the cover sheet of this intelligence report indicates that it was seen by the Chief
Secretary on April 3, 1916! The activities of ‘Chalk’ continued to provide detailed
information on IRB members such a Mc Donagh: “T.Mc Donagh and two other Sinn Feiners
were seen to enter the Restaurant in Henry St owned by Mrs W.Power and carrying heavy
handbags which they left inside. It is believed that the bags contained ammunition”.152
Augustine Birrell was not above dissembling with respect to police intelligence. He laid more
value on intelligence that underlined the link between Germany and the Irish Volunteers: “I
always thought that I was very ignorant of what was going on in the minds, and in the cellars
if you like, of the Dublin population. I was always exceedingly nervous about that… So far as
Dublin is concerned, I do not know if Sir Matthew was more in a position than I was to
receive these warnings, but I am not conscious of any until towards the end, the April 16,
when we had the letter from Stafford to General Friend telling us about the ship.”153
Policy assumptions continued to exercise an influence on the Birrell-Nathan nexus just two
weeks away from the outbreak of the rebellion. They are encapsulated in a letter that Nathan
wrote to the Adjutant General of the British Army on April 10: ”Though the Irish Volunteers
element has been active of late, especially in Dublin, I do not believe that its leaders mean
insurrection or that the Volunteers have sufficient arms to make it formidable if the leaders
do mean it. The bulk of people are not disaffected.”154
On April 22, three days before the rebellion ‘Chalk’ reported that: “The Sinn Fein Volunteers
are going out for a march on Sunday next, 23rd instant at 4 pm each man to carry three days
rations, rifle and ammunition, etc. All men employed in the Civil Service and Government
appointments (who are members) to proceed on cycles or walk to a certain place, of which
they will be notified later. These men are to leave their rifles and, etc at their respective
Depots, and they will be carried by the Transport Section to the place of meeting. This is
147
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being done with the object of safeguarding the Government servants from observation by the
police.”155
In the same report a verbatim account was provided of an address given by Thomas
McDonagh on April 19. This report also illuminated the extent to which the IRB Military
Committee, of which he was a member, had used the so called ‘Castle’ document as evidence
of British provocation and a pretext for rebellion: “Professor McDonagh on issuing the orders
on Wednesday night last said: “We are not going out on Friday, but we are going out on
Sunday. Boys, some of us may never come back –Mobilization orders to be issued in due
course.” McDonagh further stated that Kelly’s statement relative to the Army was true, and
that it came from friends in the Castle”.156 This point remains highly contested: ”According
to Eugene Smith, the government officer who smuggled the original document on which it
was based out of the castle, the document that was publicized was an edited version of an
authentic dispatch, outlining the army’s plans in the event of the imposition of
conscription.157 Yet the Report of the Royal Commission took a completely opposite view,
but acknowledged its lethality: “This document was an entire fabrication. Copies of it found
since the outbreak are shown by identification of type to have been printed at Liberty Hall,
the headquarters of the Citizen Army… many copies of this forged document were printed
and distributed, and it was widely considered by the people to be genuine, and no doubt led to
the belief by members of the Irish Volunteers and Citizen Army that they would shortly be
disarmed. This undoubtedly became one of the proximate causes of the outbreak”158
Another piece of intelligence that ‘Chalk’ provided stated that: “About 700 Martini Rifles
were recently landed at Wexford; and the Motor Car which was seized by the Police at
College Green brought 200 military bayonets to Dublin, and the were handed over to
“Captain Wafer”, who is the Armourer for the Volunteers. I have seen one of these bayonets
and it is dated 1899-a short military weapon in a black scabbard, and recently sharpened.”159
This unresolved tension between policy assumptions and the ability of intelligence to
influence decisions continued right up to the start of the rebellion at twelve noon on the April
24. This is illustrated by an account given by Lord Wimborne, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland:
“At 7 pm (April 22) the Under Secretary reported that the prisoner captured in Kerry had
been identified as Sir Roger Casement, and that he was on his way to England under a strong
guard. I concurred that the Sinn Fein Party had been much dismayed by those events, and the
menace of their rising that day could be considered at an end, that a rising was probably
contingent on the successful landing of arms and that the prospect of future tranquillity was
improved; but when the Under Secretary called at 10 pm I again reverted to the desirability of
making arrests in Dublin and urged immediate action.”160
These ambiguities, and the ability to evaluate intelligence continued into Sunday, April 23,
the day before the rebellion. At 1030 am Nathan called Lord Wimborne to inform him that
the previous night 250lbs of gelignite had been stolen for a quarry south-west of Dublin and
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taken to Liberty Hall in Dublin.161 This theft appeared, initially, to act as a catalyst for action.
Nathan proposed to raid Liberty Hall and two other ‘Sinn Fein’ arsenals whose locations
were known to the authorities. These are given as Larkfield Kimmage and Father Matthews
Park. In addition, Lord Wimborne urged him ‘to put his hand on the ringleaders.’ On the
same day the Lord Lieutenant wrote what he described as a ‘colloquial note’ to the Chief
Secretary urging him to’ write and ginger Nathan.’
On April 23, there were two conferences held by the British authorities. The first at 6 pm, and
a second at 10 pm. At the first meeting Nathan had discussed with two army officers, Colonel
Cowan, and Major Owen Lewis the feasibility of organising a raid on Liberty Hall. The
advice from these officers was that an artillery piece would be needed to gain entry to
Liberty Hall, and that this would have to be brought up from Athlone. The second conference
was much more important. It included the Chief Commissioner of the DMP, as well as four
army officers, Sir Matthew Nathan and Lord Wimborne. The discussion had a two-fold
focus: first gaining entry to Liberty Hall; secondly, securing the arrest of the leadership of the
Irish Volunteers. Lord Wimborne had argued for the need to take action: ”I advised the arrest
that night of 60 to 100 leaders. I understood the Chief Constable to concur, and to state that
immediate arrest was feasible. The Under Secretary demurred on the ground of illegality; he
asked what charge could be preferred; that to take action on the ground of hostile association
needed the concurrence of the Home Secretary. I argued that the prisoners could be remanded
until this concurrence was forthcoming.”162 With the end of this conference the last
opportunity to pre-empt the rebellion had slipped away. Despite this decision at the end of
the second conference Lord Wimborne urged upon Nathan the need for ‘immediate and
vigorous action.’ Even Nathan’s interlocutor, John Dillon, in his last letter before the
rebellion was beginning to pick rumours of an impending event. With a degree of unintended
irony he asked if Nathan had any information: “Since I arrived there on Thursday I have
heard many disquieting rumours as to mischief brewing. I trust they are without foundation. I
wonder whether you have any trustworthy information?”163
The lost opportunity of the meeting on April 23 underlined the limitations of intelligence.
Political assumptions once they had become embedded remained immutable in the face of
clear warnings and threatening events.
On the morning of the rebellion, April 24, the two police forces in Ireland continued to
provide reports of surveillance and intelligence based warnings. Lord Wimborne was given
critical intelligence by Nathan two hours before the rebellion began: “the Under Secretary
called at 10 am and reported that at 6 am a report from Limerick has arrived that Bailey, who
had landed with Casement, had been captured “he is now on trial”. He had confessed that the
other companion was Monteith, who had escaped and left for Dublin; that a rising had been
planned for that day and Dublin Castle was to be attacked. I urged that the Castle Guard be
strengthened, but the Under Secretary demurred.”164 This intelligence had been telegraphed
in cipher to the Inspector General of the RIC. It was disseminated beyond Nathan’s office.
The Headquarters of the British army’s Irish Command and the Chief Commissioner of the
DMP were informed. Chamberlain also issued orders to all RIC barracks throughout Ireland
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to be on extra alert and to watch carefully for movements of the Irish Volunteers.165 GrobFitzgibbon erroneously argues that: ”This was the only solid piece of intelligence the British
government received about the Easter rising prior to its beginning.”166 He also claimed that
Casement’s arrest and the interception of the Aud had provided Birrell with a degree re
assurance: ”The Chief Secretary’s Office, however, believed that it was ‘unlikely that the
intended rising could take place.’167
Another institution had made extensive preparations based on intelligence warnings that they
had received. The Royal Navy acted with alacrity: “We had an old battleship with a marine
battalion on board at Milford Haven and they went to Haulbowline Dockyard Queenstown.
There were also destroyers from the Grand Fleet and Harwich sent to various Irish ports, and
all the SNOs, at all the patrol bases round Ireland were warned and ready.”168
This evidence casts an instructive light on the assertions made by O’Halpin and McMahon
that Captain Hall wanted the rebellion to take place as it would provide the government with
a pretext for a policy of repression.169 These allegations have been put into perspective by
Fitzgibbon: “This counter-conspiratorial myth was, in fact, no more than a traumatic echo of
the identical and equally unfounded, myth that the British had somehow manipulated the Irish
into the rising of 1798 in order to destroy Irish nationalism and enforce an Act of Union.”170
It was not until 10.30 am on April 24, one and a half hours before the outbreak of the
rebellion, that Nathan recognised that the warnings now rendered the policy assumptions
untenable. He sent the following telegraph to Birrell: “In view of the definite association of
Irish Volunteers with the Enemy now established I agree with the Lord Lieutenant that
leaders should be arrested and interned in England. Can this be proceeded with subject to
concurrence of the Law Officers, Military authorities and Home office?”171
Less than an hour later the log of the Dublin Metropolitan Police Telephone Messages, all of
which were being copied to Dublin Castle, revealed the extent to which events were slipping
out of the control of the Irish Executive. The initiative now lay with the decisions that had
been made by the Military Council of the IRB at 8 pm on Easter Sunday when Patrick Pearse
sent a message, by couriers, to the leaders of the Irish Volunteers throughout Ireland saying
that the rebellion would start at twelve noon the next day. At 11.20 am a message from E6
AND 78E stated that: “Fifty volunteers now travelled by tram car 167 going in the direction
of the city.”172 This report was phoned to three police stations in the city and the Chief
Superintendent of ‘G’ Division. The next message sent at 11.55 am was an attempt to sustain
this monitoring. All six divisions of the DMP area were given the following instructions:
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“Please have three or four cyclists out to watch movement of Volunteers.”173At the same time
a report was received that stated that: “The Volunteers are turning everyone out of Stephens
Green Pk and locking up the gates.”174 Liberty Hall was also under surveillance. A message
received at 12.20 stated: “The volunteers are now breaking up at Liberty Hall and going in
the direction of Eden Quay.”175
As these events were unfolding Nathan’s final action was an attempt to isolate Dublin from
the south of Ireland. This would prevent the spread of any rebellion in Dublin to the rest of
the country. To do this he needed the help of Arthur Norway, Secretary of the Post Office.
Nathan had phoned him and asked him to come to Dublin Castle on the morning of April 24:
”He desired me to take immediate steps for denying the use of the Telephone and Telegraph
service over large areas of Southern Ireland to all but the military and naval use. I said that
was too important a matter to be settled verbally, and I must have it in writing. ’Very well, he
said you write what you want and I will sign it’.I was just finishing the necessary order, when
a volley of musketry crashed out beneath the window. I looked up. ’What is that I asked ‘Oh
that’s probably the long promised attack on the Castle,’ cried Nathan.”176
This attack and the occupation of the GPO was recorded by the DMP Telephone Message
log:”12.26 pm The Sinn Fein volunteers have attacked the Castle and have possession of the
GPO.”177 Approximately nine minutes later at 12.35pm the following message was sent out
to all stations in the DMP area: “Send to the Castle at once every available man also all arms
and ammunition.”178 The Royal Commission summarised well the situation that had now
come about:” Before any further effective steps could be taken the insurrection had broken
out and by noon many portions of the City of Dublin had been simultaneously occupied by
rebellious armed forces.”179
On the second day of the rebellion Germany still provided support. In accordance with an
original request made by Irish Revolutionary Headquarters it carried out diversionary attacks
designed to help the rebels.180 On April 25, elements of the German High Seas Fleet
bombarded the Kent town of Lowestoft. This bombardment lasted only fifteen minutes, but
destroyed 200 houses. It was driven off by a naval force consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser
Squadron under Commodore Tyrwitt.181 Warning of this diversion was a product of signals
intelligence from Room 40: “The Grand Fleet was hard at work refuelling when at 4.0 in the
afternoon Admiral Jellicoe received from Whitehall news of the gravest import. A rebellion
had broken out in Ireland, Sinn Fein was in possession of Dublin, the High Seas Fleet
appeared to be moving, and there was reason to believe that the Germans intended to support
the insurgents with a demonstration against our coast.”182
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The first public acknowledgement, by the British authorities in Ireland, of the involvement of
the Imperial German Government came on the first day of the rebellion. The proclamation
issued by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, Lord Wimbourne stated: “An attempt, instigated
and designed by the foreign enemies of our King and Country to incite rebellion in Ireland,
and thus endanger the safety of the United Kingdom, has been made by a reckless though
small body of men, who have been guilty of insurrectionary acts.”183
Dublin was engulfed in fighting until April 29 when Patrick Pearse, the self styled
‘Commander-in- Chief of the Army of the Republic,’ ordered a general surrender to British
Forces. The cost in terms of lives numbered 116 British soldiers and officers, thirteen
members of the RIC, three members of the DMP. There were also 318 insurgents and
civilians killed.184 In addition, the destruction in the centre of Dublin had been enormous:
“The Chief of the Dublin Fire Brigade reported that over 200 buildings had been destroyed
during the rising, and estimated the value of all that had been destroyed to be in the region of
£2,500,000.”185

Conclusions
At the beginning of this article it was stated that the bulk of the literature on the Irish
rebellion of 1916 supported the teleological narrative of intelligence failure. The structure of
this claim has three aspects. First the dissemination of and access to signals intelligence
obtained by the Royal Navy was kept isolated from both the British Cabinet and the Irish
Executive. Instead the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain Reginald Hall manipulated
intelligence for the purpose of ensuring a policy of repression was enacted by the British
authorities once the rebellion had begun. Secondly, the Admiralty’s human intelligence
resources in Ireland were limited in focus to concerns of the loyalty of dockyard employees.
Finally, the co-operation between the army and the two police forces was poor, and there was
a failure to evaluate correctly the intelligence that had been obtained.
The article provides a number of new insights into the dissemination of intelligence prior to
the rebellion. The most significant is the fact that the Cabinet and Asquith, the then Prime
Minister, were both in receipt of intelligence warnings from Room 40 before the rebellion.
Nathan was in receipt of intelligence that made the link between the Imperial German
Government and the IRB seven days before the rebellion.186 The Royal Navy was running a
human intelligence network inside Ireland that had been in part responsible for the arrest of
Sir Roger Casement.187 The Admiralty was not isolated from intelligence operations in
Ireland.
These insights focus attention on two related questions that were raised at the beginning of
this article about the extent to which there was a failure of response, and the degree to which
the assumptions of key policy makers were responsible for ignoring these warnings. The
failure of response by Birrell and his Under Secretary Nathan was sustained to the morning
upon which the rebellion broke out: “Early on the 24th the Chief Secretary’s concurrence was
183
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asked for in the proposed arrest and internment in England of the hostile leaders in view of
their definite association with the enemy having been established.”188
This failure can only be understood in the context of the political assumptions held by Birrell.
Writing in 1937, he was candid about them: “I had seen my own policy clearly from the first.
It was to pave the way for Home Rule (on more or less Gladstonian lines), and to do all that
in me lay to make any other solution of the problem impossible. In nine years of patronage, if
not power, it was possible to do a good deal in that direction.”189 A direct consequence of this
was the unwillingness to enforce the basic parameters of governance:
“The main cause of the of the rebellion appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow
up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle
that it was safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance if collision with any faction
of the Irish people could thereby be avoided. Such a policy is the negation of that cardinal
rule of Government which demands that enforcement of law and the preservation of order
should always be independent of political expediency.”190 This was also the view General
Maxwell, the British General sent to deal with the rebellion. He wrote to his wife on May 4,
1916: “It is the government as a whole that are to blame. Ever since they winked at Ulster
breaking the law they have been in difficulties and have hoped that something would turn up
…. Wait and see. Well, we waited and now see the result, viz rebellion and loss of life.”191
Another set of questions that were posed at the beginning was the nature of the intelligence
institutions upon which both London and Dublin depended. Linked to this was the manner in
which the intelligence was processed, and the quality of the intelligence that British policy
makers had access to. The British State had access to both signals and human intelligence
sources both inside and outside Ireland. The Royal Commission was deficient in one sense. It
took an ’Ireland only’ approach, that focused exclusively on the intelligence performance of
the two police forces: “We are satisfied that Sir Neville Chamberlain, the Inspector–General
of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and Colonel Edgeworth–Johnstone, Chief Commissioner of
the Dublin Metropolitan Police, required their subordinates to furnish, and did receive from
their subordinates, full and exact reports as to the nature, progress and aims of the various
armed associations in Ireland. From these sources the Government had abundant material on
which they could have acted many months before the leaders themselves contemplated any
actual rising. For the conduct, zeal and loyalty of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin
Metropolitan Police we have nothing but praise.”192 This unbalanced approach is underlined
by a question that was posed by the Chairman of the Royal Commission to Nathan on May
18, 1916: “Could you kindly tell us what organization exists in Ireland for obtaining
information about what is going on in the country and outside it as much as possible?”193
Despite access to timely and accurate intelligence, Nathan discounted, and indeed denied, the
quality of the intelligence that he had been in receipt of: “Until three days before the rebellion
there had been no definite proof of any connection between the anti-British party in Ireland
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and the foreign enemy.”194 Nathan refused to sanction, on the grounds of legality and the lack
of concurrence of the Home Secretary, the arrest of between 60 to 100 of the leaders of the
Irish Volunteers. This was despite police advice that such an operation was feasible.195It can
be argued that it would have seriously undermined the ability of the Military Council of the
IRB to have enacted the planned rebellion on Easter Monday. Nathan discounted the
possibility of any intelligence led action that could have prevented the rebellion from taking
place: ”There seems to have been a meeting of the leaders in Dublin on Saturday or Sunday
when it was decided (it is said by a majority of one) to start an insurrection on Monday. Had
information been obtained of this, the movable column would no doubt have been ordered
from the Curragh…but whether this would have stopped the wild attempt is doubtful.”196
Nathan like Birrell had a focus on a policy assumption. This assertion is not new. O’Broin
underscored it over forty years ago: “Sir Matthew acted on grounds of policy rather than on
grounds of insufficient evidence.”197 It illustrates a generic problem that exists in the
relationship between policy and intelligence: “At the point where intelligence meets policy,
leaders sometimes reject warnings.”198 The assumptions of Birrell and Nathan illuminate the
degree that intelligence warnings and responses from policy makers are driven by a timeline
that is dynamic and there is a point whereby a response to an anticipated attack or rebellion
has a marginal utility:” The issue in most cases is not a yes-or -no question of whether there
is a warning or response; rather the issue is how much warning there is and how soon
response begins.”199
An insight to this phenomenon was given by Arthur Norway: “Sir Matthew, whose action
had prevented the arrest of any ring leaders while there was still time, was shaken and
bewildered at the moment of the outbreak, it is little wonder. His reputation was gone. His
counsellor (John Dillon) had betrayed him. He has failed to guard England from added
danger. I do him the justice of believing the perception to have been very bitter to him.”200
The final propositions that were examined focussed on the accuracy of the intelligence that
the Irish Executive and the British Government had received, and the extent to which a
response became conflated with the political relationship that Birrell and Nathan had with
members of the Irish Parliamentary Party. The conclusions reached by the Royal Commission
were insightful:
“It appears to us that reluctance was shown by the Irish Government to repress by
prosecution written and spoken seditious utterances, and to suppress the drilling and
manoeuvring of armed forces known to be under the control of men who were not only
declaring their hostility to Your Majesty’s Government and their readiness to welcome and
assist Your Majesty’s enemies. This reluctance was largely prompted by the pressure brought
to bear by the Parliamentary representatives of the Irish people, and in Ireland itself there
developed a widespread belief that no repressive measures would be undertaken by the
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Government against sedition. This led to a rapid increase of preparations for insurrection and
was the immediate cause of the recent outbreak.”201
The Irish rebellion of 1916 raises two issues that have an enduring significance for the study
of intelligence. The first is what could be described as the inability of intelligence to limit
uncertainty. Irish historians when writing about the rebellion have assumed a perfectibility of
intelligence by the British State: “The principal charge against the Castle authorities- remainthat they were remarkably ignorant of where power lay in the revolutionary movement and
what the younger, fanatical leaders intended.”202 Intelligence at best can help to manage
uncertainty. The scope of what was known about the impending rebellion, both from signals
intelligence and human intelligence sources, had been conveyed to the Prime Minister, the
Cabinet, Birrell and Nathan. Yet they were all prisoners, to varying degrees, of the need to
sustain recruiting and implementation of Home Rule after the end of the war. Asquith,
writing twelve years after the rebellion, revealed his assumptions. There was no recognition
of the implications for Irish politics of an organization that could blend propaganda and
political violence: “The abortive Sinn Fein rising at Easter, 1916 was followed by a sincere
but unsuccessful effort on my part and that of my colleagues in Government to arrive at a
settlement of the Ulster difficulty.”203
The second issue is the desire for certainty. At a basic level people search for order and
complete explanations rather than accept that there are certain things they cannot know. Pillar
argues that this tendency has a particular resonance for policy makers: “The craving for
certainty is even stronger with policy makers. They want to accomplish the policy agenda
with which they came to office; they do not want to be diverted by the unexpected. The wish
becomes father to the belief.”204
Betts has argued that these two enduring issues could be resolved by the development of a
normative theory of intelligence.205 This would enable an understanding of how intelligence
structures are subject to failures of warning, or why policy makers fail to respond until it is
too late. There are inherent limitations as far as normative theory is concerned: “Development
of a normative theory of intelligence has been inhibited because the lessons of hindsight do
not guarantee improvement in foresight.”206 One of the ways that the problem of intelligence
failure and lack of response has been conceptualized is by what has been described as the
paradoxes of perception.207 The paradox that confronted the British State was a dilemma that
it proved incapable of resolving. The enforcement of the law and the preservation of order
became subservient to the political expediency of sustaining an unworkable idea- Home Rule
for Ireland. This was juxtaposed with consistent intelligence warnings from both human and
signals intelligence sources that Germany, Britain’s continental enemy, in an alliance with the
physical force element of Irish Republicanism, intended to turn a part of the United Kingdom
into a theatre of political warfare.
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